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Abstract 
 
Introduction 
The idea of being worried about child safety is nothing new. Nothing is more emotive than 
reports of children being involved in crime, accidents and disaster. Whether it is iconic 
photos of burned children from the Vietnam War from 1972, the chilling 1973 UK public 
information film ‘Lonely Water’, that discouraged young people from swimming in rivers, 
reports of children escaping from the 2004 school siege at Beslan, or pictures of a drowned 
Syrian toddler lying on a Turkish beach in 2015, we are hard wired to become upset about 
such things. Protecting children is central to the human condition, and for that reason, we 
give a great deal of conscious and subconscious thought to how we look after our young. 
Intrinsic within this is a daily attempt to keep them safe, and this means regularly assessing 
risk. However as a society, risk is not something we find it easy to assess. 
 
The reason for this is that risk is a social construction, particularly in relation to children. We 
know this because it is clear that conceptualisations of childhood have changed over the 
centuries, and with them, associated perceptions of risk. For example, where children may 
have been able to roam for miles around their homes in the past, the geographical space 
they are allowed to occupy shrunk considerably over a period of six decades, and 
presumably continues to do so. (Mey and Gunther, 2014; Hillman, Adams and Whitelegg, 
1988; Saracho and Spodek, 1998). In addition, previously the main peril for some children 
may have been considered spiritual, for example failing to be baptised before falling prey to 
an untimely death (Schofield and Midi Berry, 1971), whereas since the decline of religious 
practice and the advent of vaccinations and antibiotics, most parents of children in 
industrialised nations today would no doubt say that they feel a reasonably good sense of 
control and agency with regard to their children’s health. This is in contrast to the situation 
of children living in low-income economies who face real threats to their survival such as 
war, famine, illness, infectious disease, and vulnerability to natural disasters such as 
earthquakes, flooding and drought.  
 
It is clear that as long as you are growing up in an industrialised country, it has probably 
never been safer to be a child, yet it seems we still feel the need to find aspects of risk to 
worry about. To that end, the 21st century has brought with it new and increased concerns, 
amplified by social and mass media reporting. Risks commonly invoked range from 
frequent, low-risk events such as minor food hygiene or bullying problems, to infrequent, 
high-risk events such as paedophilia-related crime, fires, terrorist attacks and serious 
adverse weather events. Within these parameters, schools are expected to engage in 
resilience planning to ensure the safety of pupils within their charge. Yet because of the 
socially constructed nature of risk, this is something that must be done with one eye to 
public relations and the media. This makes proper risk assessment more difficult and 
potentially less effective than it needs to be.  
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This article argues that there is a need for more sociology to be done in explaining the 
nature of children’s risk within contemporary society. If risk is classified as a social problem, 
it is easier to explore why what we might term moral panic (Cohen, 2002) has arisen, and 
how it might be possible to move forwards. To this end, there are several themes that 
deserve particular attention. Firstly, examining definitions of risk is a useful starting point. 
Then it is helpful to examine the apparently paradoxical rise in risk and disaster 
management policies at a time when the idea of the expert is subject to increasing mistrust 
(Urry, 2003). An understanding of power relationships in times of what might be perceived 
as a kind of existential collective stress (Barton, 1969) plays an important role here as well. 
Finally, it is useful to examine the desire of individuals for a sense of personal and collective 
agency in the face of adverse events, something we see represented in the language of risk 
and a particular Weltanschauung or worldview adopted by certain groups. This is 
underpinned by the desire for collective sense-making and/or a genuine fear of becoming 
victims.  All of these considerations are useful in helping identify the influences that are 
shaping risk perception in relation to children in 21st century Western Europe as well as the 
US and other countries. In the chapter, these themes are considered in the light of the 
probability of different events as well as their likely seriousness. The primary focus is on 
examples from the UK, which we consider to provide particularly extreme case study of 
collective parental anxiety regarding risk, but we draw on international examples where 
possible.  
 
It is clear that there are several key factors that are influencing risk assessment in a way that 
is unrelated from the statistical probability of serious harm. These factors include the role of 
power and vested interests in maintaining a rhetoric of crisis (for example safety compliance 
as a professional currency). Another factor is the impact of the internet in speeding up 
perceptions of time, compressing distance, and increasing the perception of event 
frequency, giving a sense of something the social anthropologist Levi-Strauss might call a 
‘hot chronology’ (Levi-Strauss, 1994). Anxieties regarding the increasing complexity of 
society are often conflated with these factors, leading to real concern on the part of families 
and teachers as they seek to navigate a realistic and sensible path, what Backett-Milburn 
and Hardern (2004) describe as the ‘the shifting and dynamic nature of the mundane 
negotiation of risk’. We argue for a more sophisticated 21st century debate about the nature 
of risk and what we are prepared to tolerate for our children.   
 
Creating definitions of risk – a difficult task 
As discussed in the introduction, there are no fixed definitions available for the notion of 
risk. Many writers including Quarantelli (1998), Giddens (1991) and Beck (2007) have made 
this point repeatedly. Risk can also be seen as distinct from the idea of disaster or 
catastrophe. As Beck writes: 
 
Risk is not synonymous with catastrophe. Risk means the anticipation of catastrophe. Risks 
concern the possibility of future occurrences and developments; they make present a state of 
the world that does not (yet) exist. Whereas every catastrophe is spatially, temporally and 
socially determined, the anticipation of catastrophe lacks any spatio-temporal or social 
concreteness. 
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Therefore one way of seeing risk is that it is a relatively fluid concept that depends on 
context for its meaning. This is primarily because tolerance for risk has changed throughout 
history. One example of this change is the way that the distance children can roam from 
home has reduced. In the 1930s, the work of German researcher Martha Muchow painted a 
picture of a social world in which children were able independently to engage with and 
appropriate urban space, reshaping it into ersatz playgrounds to suit their needs (May and 
Gunther, op. cit.). This was a world in which children were actively encouraged to leave the 
home on sunny days in search of both formal playgrounds, and informal, improvised play 
opportunities on wasteground and so on, walking much further from home without parents 
than we might expect them to in the 21st century. Subsequently the ability of relatively 
young children to experience this level of independence reduced over time, and 
unaccompanied young children have now more or less disappeared from 21st century urban 
streets in many situations. This has been quantified in various studies. For example, in 
research by public health physician William Bird, (reported in Souter, 2015), we see that 
over the course of four generations, roughly a century, the permitted roaming space 
available to an eight year old boy shrank from 6 miles for a great-grandfather, to 1 mile for a 
grandfather, down to half a mile for a mother and then finally for a contemporary eight year 
old living in the same location as his his forebears, a mere 300 metres from his house.  
 
The restriction in movement is not necessarily a function of traffic density, as is often 
argued. As Hillman, Adams and Whitelegg (op. cit.) make clear, between 1922-1986, roads 
in Britain were described as increasingly safe, due to reducing casualties. Yet a factor in 
defining them as safe is that in many cases, pedestrians and cyclists have simply stopped 
using them freely, leading to apparent reductions in child road deaths per 100,000 children 
that doesn’t reflect the reality of children’s lives. In the same report, Hillam et al report that 
parents cited molestation more frequently than traffic as grounds for curtailing permission 
for children to be out after dark, even though the likelihood of an averse ‘stranger danger’ 
event in this regard is very small indeed (Pritchard, Davey and Williams, 2013).  Hillam et al 
describe the attitude of German parents during the same period to be more accepting of 
risk, despite the comparative environmental situations being broadly similar. Clearly, 
therefore, the relationship between risk, danger, safety and parental perception is a 
complex one here and poorly grounded in the statistical measures available.  
 
At the other end of the scale in terms of parental anxiety lies the concept of the ‘disaster’ 
(or catastrophe, as Beck might label it), which may take various forms. This could mean a 
natural disaster such as a flood or earthquake, a health disaster such as a disease epidemic, 
a terrorist attack, a large-scale accident such as a train or aeroplane crash, or something 
similar. For parents in the 1970s this may even have meant a nuclear event. All these things 
are considerably less likely to happen than an individual child being knocked off a bike by a 
car, for example, but the unpredictability, severity and scale of disasters means that they 
represent our most fundamental human fears in relation to our own survival. Even here 
definitions can be elusive, however. How do we differentiate between something that is just 
difficult to cope with, and something that represents a threat to survival? Up front they may 
look familiar to those caught up in the situation, and sometimes it is only with the benefit of 
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hindsight that we are able to give an event a sense of scale and proportion and label it 
accordingly.  
 
Bearing this perceptual difficulty in mind, disaster sociologists document how people 
behave during periods of collective stress (a term coined by Barton, 1969) and here it is clear 
that different models exist when defining the scale and severity of a disaster (Dombrowsky, 
1989, 1998). It may be that it makes sense to look at numbers injured or dead (something 
that could be described as an insurance model).  Another useful classification tool might be 
a lack of nutrition/clothing/housing/aid (something that might be described as a Red Cross 
model). A third classification might be the breakdown of public order and safety (something 
that could be described as a Government model). In addition to Dombrowky’s useful list of 
classifications, the psychological impact of disaster may also be significant, and the role of 
time, space and severity is also likely to be a factor (Sorokin and Merton, 1937).  
 
Within such models, while we see the effect of events on the human race as a whole, a full 
understanding of the perception of risk and disaster in the context of children needs to go 
beyond this, and beyond the kinds of cataclysmic natural or war-related disasters we might 
see on news services. Alternatively if we simply rely on published statistical information 
about children’s risk and associated reports, we reduce the framework down to a focus on 
medical and traffic-related issues, as little alternative work is done on risk in other areas for 
children (as opposed to humans in general). This means we need to move beyond the 
etiology of disaster, as listed above, towards a more subjective view that allows us to 
consider the lived experience of risk by children and those around them.   
 
To explore this properly we can borrow from Urry’s Five Elements model (Urry, 2003) and 
apply this to the particular situation of children. Urry came up with five general categories 
that can be used to understand disaster by allowing us to understand more about processes 
that unsettle people, including aspects of uncertainty and the loss of ability to define a 
situation. These five categories are: 
 
 Structure 
 Flow 
 Ideology 
 Performance  
 Complexity.  
 
The next section will explore these categories in relation to children and risk/disaster, and 
their perception within society.  
 
Structure  
While Giddens (1991) sees childhood as what he might call a ‘sequestered’ social state, with 
childhood having been moved from the public to a private, domestic domain, we also live in 
a time where attendance at school allows the state to place children in cohorts, and 
determine what is normal or not normal for children at different ages. This gives the 
relationship between home, school and social policy a certain interconnectedness, which 
brings with it in turn pressure for parents to conform. Within this is a sense of what is 
appropriate in terms of risk. Therefore if one set of parents decides it is appropriate for a 
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child to cycle to school from the age of nine, and all the other local parents decide it is not, 
the child cyclist will be seen as some kind of risk ‘outlier’ and indeed one can even imagine a 
situation where a parent might be spoken to by the school and informed that their actions 
are unusual in permitting this. In this way, anxiety levels are potentially raised by the 
structural situation of the environment external to the child. An additional factor here is 
immediacy. The nature of mass media and social media in the digital age means that space 
and time are compressed. In this climate, news feels like it is happening on the doorstep, 
and happening all the time. The consequence of this is urban risk factors are routinely 
applied to rural situations inappropriately, for example the concept of ‘stranger danger’ 
being used to discourage children from interacting with unknown adults, whereas in smaller 
communities this may be helpful or even necessary for a child’s wellbeing. Similarly the fear 
of road traffic accidents may lead indirectly to child obesity as children are increasingly 
driven long distances rather than walking or cycling1. In this category, external social 
structures are therefore used to give an indication of perceived risk and promote particular 
types of conformity. 
 
Flow  
In the previous section we touched on the influence of mass media and social media on 
perceptions of risk. In this category of flow, we see the role of charities, government 
departments and non-governmental organisations seeking to influence the social 
environment of children via harnessing the flow of information. For example, the UK’s 
National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children (NSPCC) ran a Green Dot/Full Stop 
campaign, which ended in 2008. The NSPCC engaged firms such as leading advertising 
agency Saatchi and Saatchi to create headlines such as ‘Together we can stop child abuse. 
FULL STOP’. This campaign eventually raised £250m for the charity and made the issue of 
child abuse more prominent in the public consciousness. However the charity has been 
heavily criticised for spending disproportionately on advertising to the tune of 
approximately half its revenue (Daily Telegraph, 2003), and similarly criticised for invoking 
child safeguarding issues inappropriately to engender a sense of moral panic2 and 
encourage even higher levels of fundraising from the general public (Furedi, 2014).  
 
This media-friendly approach is similar to the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). This 
charity was originally set up to provide for the physical survival of children after World War 
II, but subsequently repositioned by Chief Executive Carol Bellamy (a former US corporate 
lawyer and financier) to emphasise advocacy for children’s rights rather than maintaining a 
primary focus on child mortality. This new focus was clearly visible in the title of their 2005 
report ‘Why are millions of children losing out on their childhood?’ (UNICEF, 2005). This 
repositioning was subject to extensive criticism by the medical profession amongst others. 
As Horton (2004) argued: 
 
                                                     
1 Hillam et al (op. cit) also came to various conclusions about the link between risk and reduction in 
walking and cycling by children but linked this to deferred deaths by young drivers. The implicit 
assumption in the report was that children were not becoming sufficiently familiar with road use. 
However their report predates what has since been described as the ‘obesity epidemic’. 
2 We define this term later in the chapter.  
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A preoccupation with rights ignores the fact that children will have no opportunity for 
development at all unless they survive. The language of rights means little to a child 
stillborn, an infant dying in pain from pneumonia, or a child desiccated by famine. The most 
fundamental right of all is the right to survive. Child survival must sit at the core of UNICEF's 
advocacy and country work. Currently, and shamefully, it does not. 
 
(ibid: 2072) 
 
There are two aspects to this. Individual organisations such as the NSPCC and UNICEF 
frequently seek to harness the flow of information in this way, and in doing so, extend the 
range and involvement of their activities in the child protection/safeguarding/rights sector, 
leading to the identification of issues that they can appropriate as campaigns to bring to the 
public attention. This is always well-intentioned, after all, who would disagree with the need 
to protect children or give them rights? However the second aspect is that there are 
invariably unintended consequences as a result of doing this, because of the identification 
of campaigns on grounds of a) such campaigns being simple to articulate to the public, and 
b) apparently possible to do something about. This can distort the severity and scale of a 
problem in the eye of the public. In doing this, it has the effect of changing the perception of 
particular kinds of risk, in this case privileging child abuse as a cause at the expense of social 
deprivation, and children’s rights at the expense of poverty, disease and starvation, both of 
which are significantly more likely to kill children (Pritchard, Davey and Williams, op. cit., 
Horton, op. cit.).  
 
Ideology  
As we have argued throughout this chapter, risk is not just about actual likelihood, but also 
about belief, and it is in the category of ideology that we see the paradoxical situation of a 
desire to protect children increasing other risks. As Hillam et al make clear, driving a child to 
school increases the likelihood of road traffic accidents for other children who are not in a 
car. Similarly, a professionalised rhetoric of risk can override individual judgements via 
unintended consequences. A good example of this was the way many UK schools reacted to 
the rise of digital photography at school events. Many parents were unfairly prohibited from 
taking pictures of their own children in the name of child protection/safeguarding by head 
teachers, who freely invoked the Data Protection Act (1998) as grounds for any prohibition. 
However a school play or concert is considered to be a private event in UK law and as such 
the Data Protection Act (DPA) does not apply here. In other words, parents do not need 
permission from the school in order to take digital pictures for private use. At the same 
time, schools were routinely using digital pictures of children in publicity materials without 
parental permission, and also starting to collect biometric data without parental permission, 
for lunch payment purposes as well as library book loans. This did breach the DPA but 
schools were frequently unaware of the anomaly. For this reason the Information 
Commissioner’s Office had to issue guidance on taking photographs in schools (ICO, 2015  
 
Another example of policy being lost in translation is the trend towards public leisure 
centres introducing strict parent:child ratios for public swimming sessions. These are a 
characteristic of the UK leisure industry as many fewer rules appear to exist for swimming 
pool parent:child ratios in the rest of Western Europe, where is it generally left up to 
parents to decide about appropriate balances. The UK ratios are rooted in guidance issued 
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by the Institute of Sport and Recreation Management, but this is not always applied 
sensitively in practice. As a consequence, such ratios can be very complex for parents to 
navigate, and there is little if any flexibility. For example, taking the first example that 
appears during an internet search, we find the Tandridge Trust website, where there is a 
complex grid representing 12 different permutations of Leisure Centre (they run four 
facilities), sessions, age and ratio, that users are required to navigate.  In one box on the 
grid, for example, we learn that 
 
All Gentle Splash and under 8's sessions have a ratio of 1 adult to 2 children under 4.  All 
children under 4 are required to wear a swim aid unless they are being supervised on a 1:1 
basis.  The ratio for 4-7 is 1:3 during these sessions. 
 
Tandridge Trust (2015) 
 
This statement is typical of other leisure centres across the country. The unintended 
consequence of rigid ratios such as these may be that parents are indirectly prevented from 
teaching their children to swim, if they feel unwelcome or wrong-footed by the leisure 
centre administrators, and discouraged from attending. Here we have an example of the 
legitimacy of a professional elite (leisure centre managers) assumed, and parents effectively 
disenfranchised in the process. This is also an example of risk-related decisions being highly 
bureaucratised in a manner previously described by Scott, Jackson and Backett-Milburn 
(1998), standardizing responses without taking into account social context or life 
experience. An ideology of risk (relating to ratios) has overruled parental judgement. 
However this was not the intention of the original guidance. As the UK’s Royal Society for 
the Prevention of Accidents states: 
 
The Institute of Sport and Recreation Management (ISRM) have guidance on this and many 
pool managers will use this guidance. Some parents have found the standard ratio of adults 
to children advised by the ISRM and used by pool managers, to be restrictive. The guidance 
issued by the ISRM does allow for flexibility based on the risk present at individual pools so it 
is worth discussing this with your local pool.  
 
(Royal Society for the Prevention of Accidents, 2015) 
 
Tracing the policy back to accident data, if we look at the swimming pool accident data for 
20133, for example, we see that death by drowning in swimming pools for children is 
extremely rare, with just 6 adults and children dying in swimming pools in the UK, of whom 
3 were children (ROSPA, 2014). If we look more closely at the data, this includes incidences 
where an adult or child died because of a heart attack in the water, for example, so might 
have died anyway. The data also do not distinguish between privately owned swimming 
pools, hotel pools (where lifeguards are not usually present) and publicly owned leisure 
centres (where lifeguards are always present). So we don’t know exactly how many children 
died in a leisure centre swimming pool in 2013, and what the relationship was to the type 
and quantity of supervision. More worringly, the consequence of ratio policies may simply 
                                                     
3 There is no reason to think 2013 is atypical in terms of accident data so this is provided as an 
appropriate example.  
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be to defer deaths, in the manner that Hillam et al reported for road traffic accidents; 
heavily supervised young children of today may simply be more likely to drown as youths 
because they don’t go swimming very often and their water safety awareness is 
comparatively low, compared to that of children who swim frequently under less 
supervision. If we look at the data for swimming in rivers, we see that the figure for older 
children is indeed higher, in that 15 young people between the ages of 15-19 drowned, 
compared to only 1 in a swimming pool, suggesting risks are being taken outside the context 
of leisure centres, resulting in fatalities. This may because lifeguards are very good at saving 
lives (which we suspect they are), or it may also be because young people are not 
sufficiently safety conscious when unsupervised (which we suspect is also a significant 
factor). Either way, it is reasonable to wonder whether deaths are simply being deferred. In 
this context, ideology does not always align with statistical risk. In comparison, in the US the 
issue of children’s swimming risk has been approached more scientifically, with a greater 
emphasis on the public health aspects of mortality at a population level. There has been 
more sophisticated analysis of the nuances of risk, and several papers have pointed to the 
additional risks faced by foreign-born males and black males, putting forward tentative 
explanations for this (Saluja et al, 2006; Brenner et al, 1995). Unlike the UK, research 
attention seems to be focused on areas of actual, rather than perceived, risk.  
 
Given that there can be a mismatch between the perception of risk in this regard, and the 
reality of what is happening statistically, it is helpful to give some consideration to 
underpinning reasons. One significant factor is likely to be changes to the legal system. In 
1995, for example, the UK Government introduced the possibility of Conditional (No Win No 
Fee) agreements in personal injury cases. This was aimed at widening access to justice 
whilst also reducing the burden on the state. However this change led to a significant 
increase in the volume of personal injury cases (Association of British Insurers, 2012), which 
may have been influenced by the ability of personal injury lawyers being able to advertise 
their services. This is not simply a UK issue. For example across Europe there has been a 
statistical reduction in accident-related deaths with a corresponding increase in personal 
injury compensation claims, although financial remedy varies a great deal amongst different 
member states, which has led to demands for reform (Vismara, 2014). It is mirrored in the 
United States where there have been similar demands to address the substantial increase in 
personal injury cases since the 1950s. This type of legal action has sometimes been 
described as predatory, and it may have had the indirect effect of stifling innovation 
amongst manufacturers and entrepreneurs (Graham, Huber and Litan, 1991). If this is the 
case, we see an example of ideology at work here, where a financially motivated risk 
aversion process has taken place. To paraphrase Douglas and Wildavsky (1983), as we 
become richer we can afford to become more cautious.  
 
Performance  
So far in this chapter we have focused on the notion of relatively small-scale risk negotiated 
by families and their immediate neighbourhoods. However if we move towards the notion 
of ‘disaster’, we see that there is potential for global interests both to define and magnify 
conceptualisations of risk. For example the role of climate change on resilience planning is 
becoming increasingly significant, and international agreements are likely to rise in 
frequency and significance. This may result in international policies coming into conflict with 
local, more parochial concerns. For example, we have already stated in this chapter that it is 
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likely to be more risky to walk or cycle to school than to be driven, if the majority of children 
are being driven as well. The carbon footprint of such risk-related behaviour is such that it 
may contribute to even higher, more serious risks for children in the medium to long term, 
including changes to weather systems.  In another sense, however, it is important for the 
disaster rhetoric of climate change to grow, as invoking a global problem is likely to have the 
effect of unlocking resources for change. The same can be said to apply to issues such as 
child molestation, terrorism and border control problems. The counterpoint to this is that, 
in each case, global communication systems are amplifying the effect of incidents. This 
means something that might previously have been regarded as regional in nature is 
conflated with larger international issues, giving the impression of a crisis of some kind, 
when this might in fact represent relatively isolated incidents that were always evident 
throughout society, only now they have become defined as issues. This leads to what Beck 
terms the ‘staged anticipation of disasters and catastrophes’ (Beck, 2007: 11) in which 
governments and individuals are obliged to take preventative action, whether or not the risk 
has grown in any quantifiable sense (child molestation perhaps representing the best 
example of this).  In this way we see risk as a form of policy performance.   
 
Complexity  
Giddens describes the ideal state of being sought by citizens as a ‘state of bodily and psychic 
ease’ (Giddens, 1991) which is located in a relatively secure and predictable Umwelt, or in 
other words, the familiar physical and social environment of an individual. However 
disruption to the Umwelt, perhaps on account of the performance or staging of risk 
described in the previous section, can lead to shifts in the power balance between citizen 
and the authorities as citizens are rendered governable in the context of any changes.  
 
We have already discussed the example of UK authorities imposing parent:child swimming 
ratios with little supporting empirical evidence, but a better example here is the struggle in 
the UK surrounding the introduction of Criminal Records Bureau (CRB) checks (2003 – date) 
and later the Vetting and Barring Scheme (2009-2010) which had an even wider reach, the 
ContactPoint database (2007-2010), criticised widely as being overly intrusive, and the 
current Disclosure and Barring Scheme (2012 – date). In this case, the original CRB scheme 
came in during 2003 in the aftermath of a double child murder. It then escalated in scale 
and reach over subsequent years, resulted in tens of millions of not just teachers and health 
workers, but also ancillary workers, volunteers, charity workers and parents being screened 
for routine contact with children, even if this was to be in the presence of other adults.   
 
All this came about from a desire to reframe the staging of risk in relation to children, with a 
view to preventing future crimes of child abuse and murder. In doing so, it appeared to 
promote a view that there was such a thing as an ideal type of vetted citizen, who was 
assumed to represent reduced risk in relation to contact with children. Clearly it could never 
offer any such assurance, involving only a retrospective view of the behaviour of any 
individual in relation to one aspect of their conduct within society (i.e. recorded criminal 
convictions from England). Yet there were a number of unintended consequences as a result 
of this policy, of which the most significant was the attitude of mistrust that it engendered 
throughout society. Amongst other things, adult men became increasingly reluctant to come 
forward to assist children, with this being seen as a ‘state-sponsored activity’ requiring 
official approval (Beckford, 2012). Obviously the complexity of rendering adults governable 
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in this regard, and indeed to some extent alienated, had not been fully appreciated by the 
Government, in its desire to be seen to be responsive and proactive. In failing to understand 
such complexity, the policy is likely to have had the effect of reducing the number of non-
family members able and willing to support children in everyday life, paradoxically 
presumably increasing various risks to children’s wellbeing.  
 
Towards a sociology of uncertainty 
As discussed at the beginning of this article, the situation of children in relation to risk is 
particularly emotive, and this leads to people trying to make sense of things based on media 
reports and Government guidance, whether or not either of these things has any statistical 
basis in fact. As we have seen, in the confusion there is significant scope for a particular 
Weltanschauung or worldview based on a set of assumptions that are not always relevant.  
While we have been comparatively critical of a number of organisations in this regard, the 
real life context of their policies needs to be taken into account before judging them too 
harshly. Policymaking takes place within a society that has become increasingly 
disorientated with regard to its conceptualisation of the role, function and identity of 
children within society. Throughout each of the Five Elements we have worked through 
here, we see a particular reaction to perceived change in type and scale of risk for children 
which can frequently be termed a moral panic, because it does not necessarily correspond 
to any obvious increase in risk, only to an increased awareness of the occurrence of crime 
(for example as a consequence of extensive reporting in the media).  
 
The phrase moral panic was coined in Stanley Cohen’s 1972 book, and refers to a situation 
in which certain conditions or groups become defined as a threat to societal values and 
interests. In the introduction to the third edition (2002) Cohen presciently extends his 
definition to include child abuse, Satanic rituals and paedophile registers as new forms of 
moral panic. Cohen emphasises the role of the media in publicizing certain kinds of adverse 
events, ranging from accusations of Satanic abuse in the 1980s in Cleveland (page xv), to 
mobs marching on the houses of alleged paedophiles (page xvi), leading to serious 
consequences for public order. It appears that the apparent loss of the ability to define a 
risk-related situation amongst many individuals becomes acute when it is distilled into a 
collective response, leaving the Government to achieve a difficult balancing act between 
reaction and guidance. 
 
As Cohen writes: 
 
Public figures had to express sympathy with the parents and share the moral revulsion but 
also distance themselves from the mob. This was easily done by repeating the inherently 
negative connotations of lynch mob and mob rule, the primitive atavistic forces whipped up 
by the News of the World. The rational polity is contrasted to the crowd: volative, 
uncontrollable and ready to explode.  
 
(Cohen, 2002: xvi) 
 
Any difficulties in appraising risk for children are therefore rooted in the fact that risk has to 
be regarded as a social construct. Within this, the role of power is significant and there are 
notable vested interests in maintaining a rhetoric of risk/crisis. These vested interests 
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include that of the tabloid newspaper that appropriates such a risk narrative in order to sell 
newspapers, the large IT company that tenders to develop and run a large-scale database to 
monitor individuals, and perhaps the charity executive looking to build a career through 
enhancing the relative status of a charity within society.  All these stakeholders seek a 
tactical advantage in terms of commanding resources or attention. It is here where the term 
‘risk’ is most widely deployed and even abused. 
 
A key factor in this contemporary escalation of the children’s risk narrative is likely to be the 
breakdown of trust in modern society. We live in a comparatively fragmented modern 
society, in the throes of a technological age. This has led to a desire for individual agency 
which is in conflict with a sense of loss of control. This makes us uncertain where to invest 
our trust, and particularly receptive to risk-related statements. Within this context we see 
safety compliance grow as a means of professional currency, as we saw in relation to 
swimming pools. We see a desire to rely on expert knowledge in conflict with desire for the 
democratisation of knowledge, leading to mistrust of various forms of expertise, as we saw 
in relation to road traffic accident data and the risks of increased car journeys for children. 
These aspects of the modern risk narrative represent just two examples of conceptual 
shifting sands as society regroups, and risk moves from an objective to a subjective 
conceptualisation.  
 
Therefore in seeking to understand how risky it is to be a child, we need to be aware that 
the late 20th and early 21st centuries have brought with them a very particular view of risk. 
This may well be out of step with actual statistical risk, so part of the role of the modern 
Government, academics and risk professionals should be to challenge this, in order to 
reassure individuals whilst promoting individual freedoms. Equally, those in positions of 
authority need to take responsibility for not over-stating risk in order to gain a tactical 
advantage in going about their business. Only then can we ensure our children are truly 
cared for in an appropriate and effective way.   
 
A postscript 
During the preparation of this chapter we came across an interesting example of conflicting 
risk assessment imperatives in practice. In preparation for an Office for Standards in 
Education (OFSTED) visit in 2015, a local primary school asked their children what is a fairly 
routine safeguarding question as part of a school attitudes survey. The question was ‘Do you 
feel safe at this school?’ The response was mixed but overall it seemed that to many 
children the answer was ‘No!’ The children reported that there were two main problems 
with the school. The first was that there were many spiders and this was scary. The second 
was that they were convinced the building was haunted, and this felt even more scary. The 
moral of this tale is that we need to be very careful when imposing a 21st century view of 
safeguarding on our children, who have legitimate concerns of their own that require 
attention.  
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